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even by using prior convictions.54 Moreover, the psychological advan-
tage of a defendant's testimony, now protected by a limited scope of
cross-examination, arises only with a defendant who is a good witness.
Thus the primary factors that contribute to the general reluctance for a
defendant to testify at trial remain, and the limitation upon the scope of
cross-examination applies only for a limited purpose, the denial of the
voluntariness of an already incriminating confession. In short, despite
the extended protection afforded defendants, prosecutors should not be
unduly constrained by the Lovett decision.
Stephen H Vogt
DELVING INTO THE DETAILS OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS:
THE NEW LOUISIANA RULE
Four recent Louisiana cases have held that a cross-examiner may
properly go into details of prior convictions being used for impeachment.
In the parent case, State v. Jackson,' the defendant was charged with
armed robbery. When the principal defense witness took the stand to
testify, he was cross-examined over objection on a prior conviction.
While asking questions about his conviction for armed robbery, the pros-
ecutor inquired into a rape which occurred during the course of the prior
robbery. The court overruled previous Louisiana jurisprudence2 and
held that cross-examination concerning the rape was proper to show the
details of the crime underlying the conviction as tending to establish the
"true nature" of the conviction. Following Jackson, a unanimous court
in State v. Elam3 found that the trial court had not committed reversible
error by permitting the prosecution to examine a defendant-witness on
the details of his prior convictions. These decisions were reaffirmed by a
sharply divided court in State v. Williams and in a later State v.
Jackson.5
One common method of impeaching a witness is by prior convic-
54. Id.
1. 307 So. 2d 604 (La. 1975) [referred to hereafter in text as "Jackson I"].
2. Id at 606.
3. 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
4. 339 So. 2d 728 (La. 1976).
5. 339 So. 2d 730 (La. 1976).
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tions.6 Prior convictions are considered relevant because a witness who
has demonstrated a past willingness to disregard societal values is
deemed more likely to violate his oath on the stand.7 At common law a
witness convicted of treason, a felony, or a "crime falsi" was incompetent
to testify.8 Traitors and felons were considered incompetent because they
had been convicted of capital offenses which rendered them unworthy of
life and thus unworthy of belief in court. 9 The category of "crime falsi"
included not only crimes bearing directly on veracity, but also crimes
against the administration of justice such as suppression of testimony by
bribery.' 0 Although the incapacity to testify has been removed by statute
in almost all jurisdictions," the credibility defect for all three types of
crime has endured.12
Convictions form an exception to exclusionary rules regarding past
acts of misconduct.13 Generally, proof of specific instances of conduct is
impermissible because of the dangers of confusion of issues and unfair
surprise. 14 An exception to this exclusionary rule occurs when evidence
of past acts of misconduct is offered to show knowledge, intent, or sys-
tem.' 5 A further exception to the rule involves the use of convictions to
impeach a witness on the stand. This exception is most often justified on
the grounds that proof of a conviction is easily made, that the number of
6. LA. R.S. 15:495 (Supp. 1952) provides in part: "Evidence of conviction of crime
. . . is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness .... " For
other methods, see LA. R.S. 15:490 (1950) (general attack via reputation for truth or moral
character); LA. R.S. 15:492 (1950) (bias, interest and corruption).
7. 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 609.01 [L-3], at VI-100 (2d ed. 1976) ("Advi-
sory Committee's Note to 1969 Draft") (the Committee used this rationale to suggest using
felonies in addition to crimes bearing directly on veracity).
8. S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 373, at 513 (16th ed.
1898).
9. Id § 373, at 513-14.
10. Id § 373, at 514-15.
i1. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 43, at 85 (Cleary ed. 1972); see, e.g., LA. R.S.15:461
(1950) which provides in part: "The competent witness in any criminal proceeding . . .
shall be a person of proper understanding."
12. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609; see also State v. Odom, 273 So. 2d 261 (La. 1973) (any
crime may be used for impeachment).
13. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 979, 980 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970); see 10
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 609.01 [1-3], at VI-100 (2d ed. 1976) ("Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to 1958 Draft") ("The reasons for excluding specific instances of conduct as a
means of impeachment do not justify exclusion when the evidence takes the form of con-
viction of a crime. Dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury,
waste of time, and surprise tend to disappear or diminish.")
14. 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 609.01 [I.-3], at VI-100 (2d ed. 1976).
15. See LA. R.S. 15:446 (1950); State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126 (La. 1973).
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acts of misconduct provable in this manner is small, and that the judg-
ment cannot be reopened to raise new issues. 16 Both exceptions are usu-
ally carefully circumscribed by the courts under the general principle
that the law should not rake "into men's course of life, to pick up evi-
dence that they cannot be prepared to answer." 17
The admission of prior crimes to impeach an accused who takes the
stand in his own defense raises problems somewhat different from those
met when an ordinary witness is impeached by his prior offenses. Ap-
plied to defendant-witnesses, impeachment by convictions presents seri-
ous dangers to a fair trial.'8 The relevance to credibility cannot be
substantially doubted,' 9 but it is this almost indisputable relevance that
tends to imperil a defendant. Convictions may be given too much weight
by juries who might decide that the defendant, having committed crimes
in the past, is a character likely to have committed the crime at issue. As
one court put it, "juries are inclined to act from impulse, and to convict
parties accused, upon general principles."'20 Thus the defendant has what
McCormick calls "a grievous dilemma"-he can refrain from testifying
and risk the jury's considering his silence against him, or testify and take
the chance that his record will muddy the presumption of innocence. 2'
Recognizing the sensitive position of defendants, England adopted a
provision shielding defendants from impeachment by convictions when
the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 removed their incompetence to testify
in their own defense. The Act provided that a defendant could be im-
peached with his criminal record only if he opened the door to his good
16. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 980 at 828.
17. Hampden's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 1053, 1103 (1684).
18. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 194; Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U.
PA. L. REV. 166, 184 (1940).
19. But see Glick, Impeachment by Prior Convictions.- A Critique of Rule 6-09 of the
Proposed Rules of Guidance for U.S. District Courts, 6 CRIM. L. BULL. 330, 335 (1970),
questioning the maxim that there exists a positive relationship between criminal convic-
tions and a person's willingness to tell the truth. Glick finds a logical fallacy in this princi-
ple, as demonstrated by the following hypothetical situations: "(1) A calls B a liar. B prizes
his reputation for honesty so highly he assaults B [sic] and kills him. A [sic] is convicted of
manslaughter and is sentenced to 5 years imprisonment. (2) X has accumulated 40 traffic
tickets and has repeatedly ignored summonses to appear in court. He is sentenced to 30
days." Id at 335. In many courts B is subject to impeachment and X is not.
20. State v. Saunders, 14 Or. 300, 309, 12 P. 441, 445 (1886).
21. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 89; Ladd, supra note 18, at 184 (the
accused is not like ordinary witnesses because of his dual position-he must take into ac-
count the question of proving his innocence to the crime charged as well as the dangers he
will expose himself to by taking the stand in the face of evidence the prosecution may use
to discredit his testimony).
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character or impugned the character of the prosecution witness. 22 The
redactors of the Federal Rules of Evidence found another solution to the
problem by requiring the judge to determine whether the probative value
of the conviction as impeachment evidence outweighs the prejudice to
the defendant before a felony conviction can be used against any wit-
ness.23 Others can find no adequate safequards, and for this reason the
22. Since 1865 England has permitted impeachment by convictions of any witness.
The Criminal Procedure Act, 1865, 105 Statutes at Large 32, ch. 18, § 6 provided in part:
"A witness may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any felony or misde-
meanor, and upon being so questioned, if he either denies or does not admit the fact, or
refuses to answer, it shall be lawful for the cross-examining party to prove such conviction
..... Then, in 1898, The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 35 The Law Reports-Statutes,
ch. 36, § 1(0 was adopted, providing in part:
Every person charged with an offense. . . shall be a competent witness for the defense
.... Provided as follows: . . .(f) A person charged and called as a witness. . . shall
not be asked . . . any question tending to show that he has committed or been con-
victed of. . .any offenses other than that wherewith he is charged . . . unless . . .(ii)
he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecu-
tion with a view to establish his own good character . . . or the nature or conduct of
the defense is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the
witnesses for the prosecution ....
The principal effect of section 1(f) is to provide the accused with a shield which is only
thrown away if he gives evidence of his good character or casts imputations on the prosecu-
tor or the witness for the prosecution. When the shield is thrown away, the accused is liable
to be cross-examined on his criminal record. See CROSS, ON EVIDENCE, 353-79 (4th ed.
1974). The English courts recognize that once revealed to a jury, the record of convictions
causes unfair prejudice to an accused; therefore, the judge may always exclude record of a
defendant's prior convictions if the probative value fails to outweigh prejudicial effect. See
Maxwell v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 309 (H.L. 1934). In interpreting sec-
tion 1(f), the courts have not lightly thrown away this shield. Rex v. Redd, [1923] 1 K.B.
104 (1922) (charge of housebreaking; a witness for the defense volunteered a statement on
the defendant's good character, but the court held that the door was not open to evidence
of the defendant's criminal record); Stratton's Case, [1909] 3 Crim. App. 255, 256 (The
defendant answered the following question about the prosecutor: "Then you say he is not
telling the truth?"-"He is not"; held, door not open). Further protection for an English
defendant was provided by Rex v. Sweei-Escoll, [1971] 55 Crim. App. 316, where the court
held that judges must exclude prior convictions that are too remote to be probative of
present credibility; a twenty-year-old conviction was too remote. This case is interesting
because the defendant was being tried for perury for denying his prior convictions when
asked about them at a previous trial in which he was a prosecution witness; because the
conviction evidence was improper at that trial, it could not form the basis for a perjury
charge.
23. FED. R. EVID. 609(a): "General rule-For the purpose of attacking the credibility
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted . . . only if
the crime (I) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year . . . and the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudi-
cial effect to the defendant . .. ."
The House Committee worried so much about defendants that it proposed to limit
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Hawaii Supreme Court reached the conclusion that "to convict a crimi-
nal defendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his
credibility as a witness violates the accused's constitutional right to tes-
tify in his own defense." 24
Most American jurisdictions have avoided the problem of special
protections for defendant-witnesses, since they provide extensive protec-
tions for all witnesses by permitting only a limited use of convictions for
impeachment. 25 The jurisprudence generally prohibits cross-examiners
from going beyond the fact, kind, and date of the convictions 26 except
under special circumstances, such as where the witness has volunteered
convictions against any witness to veracity crimes only: "because of the danger of unfair
prejudice in such practice and the deterrent effect upon the accused who might wish to
testify, and even upon a witness who was not the accused, cross-examination by evidence of
prior convictions should be limited to those kinds of convictions bearing directly on credi-
bility, i.e., crimes involving dishonesty or false statement." H.R. REP. No. 93-649, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973). The Senate Committee amended the House version to protect
the defendant from impeachment by convictions not involving dishonesty or false state-
ment and proposed that felonies be used against ordinary witnesses "if, and only if, the
court finds that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect against
the party offering that witness." S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974). The
Conference amended the Senate version and adopted the present rule that felonies can be
used against any witness, but with the safeguard that prejudice against the defendant must
be considered: "[Tihe Conference determined that the prejudicial effect to be weighed
against the probative value of the conviction is specially the prejudicial effect to the
defendant." H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974).
24. State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 260, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971).
25. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 88 ("On the whole ...the more reasonable
practice, minimizing prejudice and distraction from the issues, is the generally prevailing
one that beyond the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction, and the punish-
ment, further details such as the name of the victim and the aggravating circumstances may
not be inquired into."). See note 26, infra.
26. Fulton v. State, 335 So. 2d 280, 284 (Fla. 1976) ("When there has been a prior
conviction, only the fact of the conviction can be brought out, unless the witness denies the
conviction . . . .If the witness denies ever having been convicted . . . counsel may im-
peach the witness by producing the record . . . .Even if a witness denies a prior convic-
tion, the specific offense is identified only incidentally when the record . . . is entered into
evidence."); People v. Jacobs, 45 App. Div. 2d 675, 356 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1974) (the defendant
was asked how many times and in what ptrts of the body he stabbed his victim in a prior
homicide conviction-new trial ordered).
The federal courts have similarly held that only fact, kind and date may be shown:
United States v. Mitchell, 427 F.2d 644, 647 (3d Cir. 1970) ("The prosecution is limited to
establishing the number of convictions, the nature of the crimes, and time and date of each
. ... ); Tucker v. United States, 409 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.l (5th Cir. 1969) ("The law is too
well settled . . . to require citation of cases . . . . He was required to give answers only as
to whether he had been previously convicted of a felony, as to what the felony was and as
to when the conviction was had.").
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details on direct examination or has chosen to explain the circumstances
of the prior offenses in an effort to mitigate the damage to his credibil-
ity.27 Details of convictions, such as the type of weapon used in the prior
crime or the bulk and age of the victim, 28 do not come in under cross-
examination in most courts on the theory that counsel must not be al-
lowed to add to the "pungency of the impeachment. '29 This rule not
only protects defendants who have criminal records, but also shows sen-
sitivity for ordinary witnesses and thereby minimizes public distaste for
the witness box.30 In England, where specific instances of conduct may
be broadly inquired into on cross-examination of a non-defendant wit-
ness, the law protects a witness from the details of his misdeeds by re-
quiring the judge to forbid questions that are vexatious, i.e., unnecessary
and of doubtful relevance to present credibility.3'
In Louisiana, under State v. Danna32 and State v. Perkins,33 the
supreme court interpreted section 495 of title 15 of the Revised Statutes
to be explicit in allowing evidence of convictions to be used to impeach a
witness without permitting the details of the underlying crimes. But
Jackson I overruled those cases, and in full recognition of the prevailing
27. United States v. Bray, 445 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant narrated some of the
details of his conviction in order to extenuate his guilt, and cross-examination about details
was therefore proper); Eachus v. People, 124 Colo. 404, 238 P.2d 885 (1951) (Defendant
was unclear about the nature of his convictions; within the discretion of the court, the
prosecutor properly brought out that two of the prior crimes were larceny); Perin v. Peuler,
373 Mich. 531, 130 N.W.2d 4 (1964) (witness has a right to offer the jury an explanation for
the convictions, and it is within the judge's discretion to permit cross-examination on the
details of this explanation); State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. App. 439, 165 S.E.2d 15 (Ct. App.
1969) (where the defendant is evasive about his convictions, the prosecutor may "freshen"
his memory with details).
28. State v. Mount, 64 A. 124 (N.J. App. 1906); State v. Norgaard, 272 Minn. 48, 136
N.W. 2d 628 (1965).
29. C. MCCORMICK, supra note I1, at 88.
30. See Third Great Western Turnpike Road Co. v. Loomis, 32 N. Y. 127, 139 (1865)
("Justice to a witness demands, that the court to which he appeals for present protection
shall have the power to shield him from indignity, unless the circumstances are such that he
cannot fairly invoke that protection."). See also 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 983 at
841.
31. S. PHIPsoN, EVIDENCE 1552 (Argyle ed. 1963); see also 3A J. WIGMORE, supra
note 13, § 984 at 852 (witness privilege against "disgracing answers"). No cases could be
found regarding details of prior convictions, but considering the English concern for pro-
tecting a witness from indignity, the defendant's shield from prior conviction evidence, and
the judge's power to exclude vexatious questions, it can be argued that details such as the
type of weapon used or the age of the victim or how many times the victim was stabbed
would not be permitted in England.
32. State v. Danna, 170 La. 775, 129 So. 154 (1930).
33. State v. Perkins, 248 La. 293, 178 So. 2d 255 (1965).
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rule in other jurisdictions Louisiana has apparently become the only
state to hold that a cross-examiner may delve into the details of convic-
tions irrespective of special circumstances. 34 The court, by a narrow ma-
jority, examined Wigmore's "auxiliary policy" rules for the exclusion of
past misconduct evidence, 35 finding that confusion of issues and unfair
surprise were considerations inapplicable to evidence of prior convic-
tions. As the court stated, "The record proves the conviction; unfair sur-
prise is not a problem."' 36 Thus the court determined that where a
conviction is relevant to credibility, those details necessary to establish
the "true nature of the offense" are permissible evidence.37
In the instant cases the supreme court has changed the rule permit-
ting only fact, kind, and time38 of the conviction to be shown by defining
"kind" or "nature" of the conviction to mean the details of the criminal
conduct involved. 39 For other courts, and formerly in Louisiana, "na-
34. UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, Impeachment of Witnesses, § 243 at 762 (Her-
rick ed. 1973) (emphasis added): "[Some] jurisdictions permit certain minimum details to
be asked initially. These minimum details generally include nature (name) of the crime, the
time and place of conviction and the length of sentence. No jurisdictions permit more than
these minimum details unless there are special circumstances." See also cases cited in note 27,
supra.
35. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 978 at 822: "The exclusionary doctrine is purely
one of auxiliary policy. . . , i.e., it excludes certain relevant facts, when offered by outside
testimony, because of objections of policy to that mode of presentation." Id § 979 at 826:
"These reasons of auxiliary policy are. . . reducible to two: (a) confusion of the issues...
(b) unfair surprise .... "
36. 307 So. 2d at 608 (La. 1975); see text at note 16, supra.
37. 307 So. 2d at 608.
38. See note 27, supra.
39. 307 So. 2d at 608. First, the court found that evidence "of the real nature of the
offense is relevant to credibility, whether the evidence tends to minimize or increase the
seriousness of the offense." Then the court stated, "It is not the conviction which im-
peaches, but the unlawful act. The conviction simplifies proof." Following this, the court
held that details are admissible.
In State v. Jackson, 339 So. 2d 730 (La. 1976), transcript no. 57627 at 222 et. seq., the
court permitted the following cross-examination of a defendant on his prior convictions:
"Q-Let's be a little more specific with these convictions .... Let's start out from the
beginning, back in 1968. You had a trespassing conviction, didn't you?
A-Yes, sir.
Q--Okay, tell us about that trespassing.
Q-Well, we're not getting anywhere on that one. Let's go on to the next one, the one
about negligent injury. Tell us what happened there.
A-Me and a friend of mine was playing.
Q-Playing what?
A-With a pistol.
Q-Uh-huh.
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ture" of the convictions means simply whether the crime is a felony, a
misdemeanor, or a crime involving dishonesty. The Supreme Court of
Arizona expressed the rule in this manner: "The weight of the evidence
• . .depends upon the character of the crime. . . as, whether it involved
moral turpitude or was merely malum prohibitum. ''40 Hence, "nature"
of the offense functions in most jurisdictions as an express limitation on
cross-examination which stops cross-examiners from going into prejudi-
cial or irrelevant details, whereas in Louisiana the term is presently being
used to sanction such conduct.
The court in Jackson I based much of its reasoning on an examina-
tion of Wigmore's auxiliary policy rule for excluding relevant evidence
of specific instances of misconduct and found that those courts which
prohibit evidence of conviction details operate under a misunderstand-
ing of the policy. 4' Although Wigmore did not address this precise ques-
tion, the court made a fair inference that the policy rule should not apply
to cross-examination of a witness on the details of his convictions. The
reason for this can be found in the rationale Wigmore employed to ex-
cept intrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct from the rule-a
person can be expected to know and answer inquiries about his own
deeds and thus "the matter stops with question and answer." 42 Further-
more, the trial judge has discretion to prevent undesirable questions,43
which protects the trial from confusion of issues. Jackson I, however, did
not differentiate, as Wigmore did, between intrinsic and extrinsic proof
of relevant specific instances of conduct. The case gives no guide on the
A-And I shot him.
Q-Uh-huh, where did you shoot him?
A-In the eye.
Q-And now what about this attempted simple rape? ....
A-She was a girl friend of mine.
Q-Well, give us some specifics. What did you do?
A-It was a-girl friend of mine.
Q-Uh-huh.
A-She was under age.
Q-How much under age was she?
A-She was about fifteen ....
Clearly the new rule differs from fact, kind and date, and, as demonstrated by the Jackson
II transcript, lets in evidence of prejudicial and time-wasting facts.
40. Hadley v. State, 25 Ariz. 23, 36, 212 P. 458, 462 (1923).
41. State v. Jackson, 307 So. 2d 604, 607 (La. 1975) ("The rule that the details of the
crime are inadmissible has developed from a misapplication of the rules concerning all past
misconduct evidence.").
42. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 981, at 838.
43. Id § 983 at 847.
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introduction of extrinsic proof, whether by record or by testimony, to
prove a detail which a witness has falsely denied. If the case can be read
to permit such a practice, it would violate Wigmore's auxiliary policy.
Elam applied the Jackson I holding to defendant-witnesses without
discussion." When the defendant takes the stand, special reasons for
prohibiting the details of his convictions emerge, yet the court did not
examine these factors. Wigmore's policy for excluding certain evidence
of a defendant's misconduct is:
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal . . . is to give
excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and
either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to
take proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of
the present charge.45
Details of a defendant's prior crimes before a jury may be highly and
unfairly prejudicial. In fact, because any evidence of a defendant's unsa-
vory past may be prejudicial, the Louisiana jurisprudence has provided a
defendant with a mantle of protection from impeachment by evidence of
prior arrests, of crimes for which there has been no conviction, and of
past criminal charges.46 But after Elam and its progeny it is no longer
correct to say that we "have zealously placed safeguards around the in-
troduction of evidence of other convictions offered for the purpose of
impeaching the credibility of a defendant.
47
Gerard E Wimberly, Jr.
THE TAXABILITY OF CASH MEAL ALLOWANCES: FORM
PREVAILS OVER SUBSTANCE
During 1970 the taxpayer received a base salary of $8,739.38 and an
additional $1,697.54 in cash meal allowances from the New Jersey Divi-
sion of State Police. Paid biweekly in advance, the cash meal allowances
were included with the taxpayer's salary and were separately stated and
accounted for in the state's accounting system. No restrictions were
44. State v. Elam, 312 So. 2d 318, 325 (La. 1975).
45. 1 J.WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 194, at 646.
46. See State v. Perkins, 248 La. 298, 303 178 So. 2d 255, 259 (1965); see also LA.
R.S.15:495 (Supp. 1952).
47. State v. Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973).
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